Monday August 7, 2000
By Dariush Sajjadi
The Iranians at home and abroad often show exaggerated responses toward contemporary situations and events, even though they normally have different concerns and demands.
The Iranians residing abroad have turned out in large numbers for events such as the US-Iran soccer match last year or pre-revolution pop singer Googoosh’s concert in Canada just recently. Such turnout is reflective of the "psychosis" dominating Iranians abroad who mostly left their motherland two decades ago and who still feel isolated in their host countries. They, therefore, try to hang on to means that would restore their national identity and prestige in their new settings.
The hostile responses of Iranians inside the country toward domestic social, economic, or political problems send out warning signals that the people and the government are not properly interacting, a condition that could be exacerbated and bring about costly consequences in case it is not curbed.
The peoples’ aggressive reactions after the July 1999 student protests, as well as violent unrest in Abadan, Islamshahr, Qeer, Khalkhal, alongside huge turnouts in funerals of (famous dissident poet) Ahmad Shamlou and (popular 1940s actor) Mohammad Ali Fardin, are ways to sneer at the system and bring out a somewhat hooligan spirit lurking deep inside the Iranians. And such reactions could speedily turn malignant and contagious, if not precluded.
Iranians at home and abroad, however, grapple with different causes that lead to psychosis, and this is because of their diverse social demands: Iranians abroad are concerned with matters of national identity and dignity, while Iranians at home are avid for self-assertion. Both reasons prompt the two groups to seize any opportunity available to shine and grab attention.
Anomalous behavior inside Iran -- such as the young generation’s blind imitation of the Rappers or Western dressing, hairdo, make-up -- is taken as a sign of the enemies’ cultural invasion, an interpretation that shows the administrators’ inability to find the ulterior motives behind such goings-on.
In the 1950s the monarchic government’s infatuation with the Western civilization prompted the Iranian youth to view the West with awe and admiration and to be ultimately inspired by the West.
The modern Iranian youth’s inclination toward the Western civilization is not, however, an infatuation. It has appeared because the youth’s physical demands and their quest for fun and happiness are suppressed. When these demands are not fulfilled, the youth sneer at and show obstinacy toward authoritarian policies to purify them and turn them into saints. The youth then over-emphasize their looks as a means for self-assertion.
The youth are inherently avid to be in the spotlight. In case they cannot legitimately meet this innate need, they will turn to other means without worrying about the costs they have to pay.
Arthur Koestler has cleverly noted that all revolutionary communist girls were Cinderellas who were never invited to dance at any ball.
Viewed as such, the Ansar Hizbullah’s desire to violently challenge the opposition could be taken as another way in which the modern youth try to assert themselves, as opposed to the other side of the scale in which the youth wear unconventional clothes. Both groups have a dire need to assert themselves in accordance with their capacities, personalities, and cultural upbringing.
The only anthropological similarity between the Iranian community at home and abroad is their fondness for President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. The difference again lies in the fact that for Iranians residing abroad, Khatami symbolizes national identity and dignity, while for Iranians inside the country he stands for restoration of national rights and ideals.
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