October 21, 1999 (Cambridge, MA)
[Published in Iran News "Political Section"]
BY DARIUSH SAJJADI
The Elysee Palace will host the Iranian President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, but this is not Paris’ first experience, as it hosted another Iranian president years ago. The two incidents are, however, diametrically different. In 1981, Paris hosted Iran’s first president Abul-Hassan Bani Sadr, who had actually fled Iran and arrived in Paris as an exile following disputes with the country's ruling religious wing.
Upon his arrival in Paris, Bani Sadr, in a press conference, declared that he would soon return to Iran, since 90 percent of Iranians supported him. A shrewd reporter asked if he had fled the country because he feared only 10 percent of the Iranian population! Eight years passed, but Bani Sadr never returned to Iran.
This time, however, the Iranian President will arrive in France upon an official invitation. This will be the second time France officially hosts a high-ranking Iranian dignitary. The first time was in 1979 when France showed generous hospitality toward Ayatollah Khomeini, the deceased Leader of the Islamic Revolution.
Khatami's trip to Paris is of political and economic importance for Iran. Beyond this, the visit can enhance Iran’s image and prestige, since Khatami would be able to cement his détente policy with the world, a policy he adopted and forcefully exercised ever since he took office in 1997.
As part of his détente policy, Khatami was able to successfully convene the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Tehran and to chair this body. These were, in fact, Khatami's first steps toward improvement of Iran’s relations with other countries, the first fruit of which was the betterment of Iran’s relations with its powerful regional neighbor Saudi Arabia.
Khatami now aims at vigorously pursuing this policy with Europe, attaching
more importance to Britain, France, and Germany as the leading countries of the European Union (EU).
During his term of presidency, former president Hashemi Rafsanjani was also eager to boost Iran’s ties with other countries. But he either did not get the chance to do so or was barred from doing so.
After the Iran-Iraq war and acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598, the Hashemi administration adopted a political outlook toward the resolution, viewing it as a mechanism to reach their aims and objectives.
As such, the Hashemi administration opted to win the votes of the Security Council members to be able to enforce Resolution 598. Iran’s foreign diplomacy in the Hashemi era was, therefore, based on improving relations with two major players in the Security Council, namely France and Britain, and giving positive signals to the U.S. (the powerful member of the Security Council).
Hashemi Rafsanjani faced not much of a problem with other Security Council members. As such, Tehran's relations with London and Paris improved over this period.
Also this was the time when the then president’s advisor for parliamentary affairs Ataullah Mohajerani published his sensational article "Direct Talks" in a moderate paper and defended the need for direct talks with the U.S. This article raised a storm of protest in Iran, and Mohajerani was seriously rebuked by the Leader of the Revolution for writing it.
Following up this policy, Hashemi was able to better Iran’s relations with France. His administration was to host the then French president Francois Mitterand. This visit, however, never took place due to "the suspicious assassination" of the Pahlavi regime’s last premier Shahpour Bakhtiyar, who was had sought asylum in France. As such, Hashemi Rafsanjani’s dream of hosting the president of a powerful European country never came true, and Iran-France relations became frosty.
The then deputy foreign minister Mohammad Javad Larijani, an anglophile among Iranian diplomats, was also making attempts to improve Tehran-London relations. But his attempts also turned to dust when a decree was issued on the apostasy of Salman Rushdie and when the Iranian Parliament, in a hasty move, decided in favor of severance of Iran’s relations with Britain.
The most serious blow to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s theory of improvement of ties with Europe was dealt in the Mykonos case, forcing the Iranian administration to see the defeat of their diplomacy.
Contrary to Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami is now walking on firmer grounds for improvement of ties with Europe.
Khatami’s advantage is that he enjoys high legitimacy and popularity among the people, since he won an overwhelming majority of votes in a democratic election. Also by advancing the idea of "dialog among civilizations" he has been able to attract the international public opinion.
This is why he can take more solid steps toward betterment of relations with other countries. But, like Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami also suffers from some of the past problems such as efforts by his opponents to create stumbling blocks along the way of betterment of relations with other countries.
Among measures taken by Khatami’s opponents to stifle his plans and policies, reference can be made to the attack by an unidentified group on a bus transporting American merchants in Tehran last year, the arrest and trial of German merchant Helmut Hofer, ban on the reformist daily Jame’ah and crackdown on its administrators last year (simultaneous with Khatami’s trip to New York), arrest and trial of independent and reformist cleric Mohsen Kadivar (concurrent with Khatami’s trip to Italy), and trial of Abdullah Nouri, a powerful and close ally of the President (on the verge of Khatami’s visit to France).
Even though the numerous crimes and obstacles created by the clique opposing Khatami came to light a while back when the Information Ministry
gang responsible for assassinating Iranian political and literary figures was busted, the hidden branches of this gang are still pursuing their plots in secret. One should now wait and see what this gang has in store to create tension in Iran on the threshold of Khatami’s trip to Paris.
هیچ نظری موجود نیست:
ارسال یک نظر